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Do Minimum Wages in Latin America and the Caribbean Matter?   
Evidence from 19 Countries 
 




  Despite the existence of minimum wage legislation in most Latin American countries, there 
is little empirical evidence demonstrating its impact on the distribution of wages. In this study, 
cross-country data for 19 Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries is analyzed to gain an 
understanding of if and how minimum wages affect wage distributions in LAC countries. 
  Although there is no single minimum wage institution in the LAC region, we find regional 
trends.  Minimum wages affect the wage distribution in both the formal and, especially, the 
informal sector, both at the minimum wage and at multiples of the minimum.  The minimum 
does not uniformly benefit low-wage workers: in countries where the minimum wage is 
relatively low compared to mean wages, the minimum wage affects the more disadvantaged 
segments of the labor force, namely informal sector workers, women, young and older workers, 
and the low skilled, but in countries where the minimum wage is relatively high compared to the 
wage distribution, it primarily affects wages of the high skilled. This indicates that the minimum 
does not generally lift the wages of all, but instead, it offers a wage into which employers can 
“lock in” wages that are already near that level.  Thus, minimum wage legislation is more far-
reaching than originally thought, affecting both the uncovered informal sector and those earning 
above the minimum.  In addition, the relative level of the minimum wage is important for 
determining whose wages are affected.   
 
This study is part of the regional study "The Role of Minimum Wages in Latin America: Poverty 
Alleviation, Income Inequality, Employment, and Wages". 
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I.  Introduction 
The objective of the minimum wage is to guarantee a socially acceptable wage, and thus a 
decent standard of living, for all workers.
2  Neoclassical economics predicts that mandating a 
wage that is higher than the market wage may increase the wages of some low-skilled workers, 
but at a cost to other low-skilled workers who lose their jobs as employers adjust, whether 
through higher payments to other workers or a substitution away from labor into capital.  A vast 
literature in the United States and Europe shows that the neoclassical model does not strictly 
hold since minimum wage legislation seems to have negligible to very small positive impacts on 
unemployment and wages.
3, 4  The effects that can be statistically identified are primarily limited 
to teenage workers, who tend to earn wages near the minimum wage, but there is little evidence 
of any impacts on adult workers.  Not surprisingly, the poverty impacts of minimum wages are 
also absent, due to the fact that minimum wages have little impact on wages or employment and 
many minimum wage earners in these countries are not among the poor, but instead are young 
workers who live in non-poor families (Burkhauser, 1996).  Together, these facts bring into 
question the role of the minimum wage as an anti-poverty tool. 
Recent literature in Latin America suggests that perhaps we should not dismiss the minimum 
wage since it seems to have different effects in the specific labor market conditions in the 
                                                   
2 The definition of “socially acceptable” differs by country and across time.  The concept of the minimum wage 
originated in the late 1800s, and was intended to prevent a situation of “sweating,” defined as “earnings barely 
sufficient to sustain existence” (Webb, 1912).  As minimum wage institutions developed in Latin America, the 
“socially acceptable” wage was more generous than in Europe or than in the United States.  In many countries, it 
was intended to cover the food, shelter, clothing, health, leisure, and educational needs of the worker and the family 
(Starr, 1982).    
3 For a review of the US and European literature, see Brown (1999).   
4 No overall consensus prevails with respect to employment and wage effects of minimum wages.  Card and 
Krueger (1994, 1995) find that an increase in the minimum wage in 1992 in the low-skilled fast food industry in 
New Jersey lead to an increase in the wages of low wage workers.  Several studies emerged to test this result, 
including Machin and Manning (1994), who find similar results for the UK, Neumark and Wascher (1992) who find 
the opposite result when using a different data set to study the same experiment, and Dolado et al. (1996) who find 
the opposite result for France.   
   3
Region.  Specifically, 30-70 percent of Latin American workers are employed in the informal 
sector (Maloney, 2004), which, by definition, is not bound by a minimum wage; the low-wage 
population in Latin America includes many adult workers so the results may be more widely felt 
across the economy; and alternative wage-setting mechanisms developed in Latin America due 
to, among other factors, hyper-inflation and protectionism. 
Turning to the literature, we find that minimum wages have the expected neoclassical 
impacts in several Latin American countries:  a positive effect on formal sector wages and an 
increase in unemployment rates in the few countries for which studies exist.
5  The evidence on 
the impact of minimum wage legislation on the informal sector is mixed:  some studies – mostly 
in Brazil – find that there are positive wage and negative employment effects, as predicted by 
neoclassical theory for competitive labor markets (Fajnzylber 2002; Maloney and Nuñez, 2004; 
Neri, Gonzaga, and Camargo 2002; Soares 1998; Foguel, Ramos, Carneiros 2000; Lemos 2002), 
while others find decreased average wages and increased employment in the informal sector due 
to the general equilibrium effects of the impacts on the formal sector in a dualistic economy 
model (Gindling and Terrell 2005 for Costa Rica; Carneiro 2002 for Brazil).  Fewer studies 
examine how the minimum wage affects the overall wage distribution, particularly in the 
informal sector (Maloney and Nuñez 2005, Lemos 2002, Bell 1997, Neri, Gonzaga, and 
Camargo 2000, Soares 1998).    
This paper examines trends in minimum wage legislation in the Latin America and 
Caribbean region, rather than focusing on a specific country, by laying out a series of facts to 
shed light on the institutional and labor market implications for minimum wages in the region.  It 
begins by describing the minimum wage institutions in 24 Latin American countries and shows, 
                                                   
5 Most of the Latin American minimum wage literature is based on analysis of Brazil.  There is a smaller collection 
of papers from Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and Costa Rica.  See Annex III of World Bank (2006) for a full review.   4
not surprisingly, that it is not possible to speak of a single LAC minimum wage institution.  
Next, it examines evidence on who the minimum wage earners are in LAC in order to determine 
if they are few and far between, as in the OECD countries, or if they are a substantial portion of 
the workforce.  Given this background, it expands on the Maloney and Nuñez (2004) eight 
country analysis
6 to study the wage distributions of 19 LAC countries to determine if the 
minimum affects the distribution and whether the institutional factors may contribute to the 
observed trends.   
 
II.   Minimum  Wage  Institutions 
 
Minimum Wage Institutions in LAC 
 
While all Latin American countries have a legislated minimum wage, there is not a common 
“minimum wage system” for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).  Table 1 describes the 
minimum wage institutions in 24 countries in LAC in terms of:  the number of minimum wages, 
work period covered by the minimum, scope of minimum wage setting, the body that determines 
the minimum, frequency that it is changed, criteria for adjustment, sub-minimum payments, 
whether it applies to the public sector, and sanctions for non-compliance.  Perhaps the only 
commonality across the region is that the goal of the systems is to set a wage floor that provides 
a minimum standard of living for the worker and, in some cases, his/her family.  In many 
countries, minimum wages are Constitutionally mandated, some dating back to the 1930s, when 
the concept of a minimum wage was new to the world (Starr 1982).   
The individual institutions that have developed in Latin America and the Caribbean over 
time show a wide range of  minimum wage levels and categories (Table 1).  While Argentina, 
                                                   
6 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico and Uruguay.  Six of these countries are in the top 
seven among the 19 countries included in this analysis with respect to per capita GDP.    5
the Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Haiti, and Trinidad and Tobago are the only countries in LAC with 
a single minimum wage, and many others have a few well defined minimum wages (two in 
Colombia and Jamaica; three in Chile; and four in Belize and Peru), some countries, such as the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, and Venezuela, have hundreds of 
legislated minimum wages.  Special minimum wages may be set for apprentices,
7 the public 
sector,
8 youth,
9 workers with disabilities (Argentina, Chile, Honduras, Paraguay), domestic 
workers (Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay), or specific occupations, 
including soccer players in Peru, the self-employed in Chile, street vendors in the Dominican 
Republic, bee farmers in Mexico, and bakers in Guatemala.  All countries define a minimum 
wage by time spent working (hour, day, or month), but some have extra legislation by task 
(Uruguay, Dominican Republic), output quantity (Dominican Republic, and Guatemala), or even 
horsepower of the equipment (Dominican Republic).  The coverage of the minimum wage may 
be national,
10 regional (Mexico), by occupation or industry/activity,
11 task, firm size, or any mix 
of these (Table 1). 
The patterns that emerge from the Latin American institutions suggest that tripartite wage 
setting is associated with complex minimum wage systems.  While the government alone sets the 
minimum wage in some countries (Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Jamaica, and Uruguay), a tripartite 
committee comprised of government, worker representatives, and employer representatives is the 
wage-setting body in others,
12 while worker and employer representatives set the wage in still 
                                                   
7 Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela 
8 Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Honduras, Jamaica, Argentina, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica 
9 Argentina, Belize, Chile, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela 
10 Brazil, Bolivia, Bahamas, Colombia, Chile, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, Peru 
11 Belize, Costa Rice Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua 
12 Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela   6
others (Table 1).  Those countries with the most complex wage structure (i.e. hundreds of 
minimum wages) tend to be those where the wage is set by a tripartite council.
13   
The minimum wage is changed on a regular basis (every six months or annually) in about 
half the countries, with discretionary changes in others.
14  Adjustments to the minimum wage 
may be tied to inflation (in half the countries), GDP fluctuations, the poverty line or market 
wages (Table 1).  In Paraguay and Haiti, the legislation states that inflation rates equal to or 
higher than 10 percent should trigger a renegotiation of the minimum wage.
15  Although many 
countries have a formula to set the minimum wage, in the end, the calculation is fairly random, 
based on public perceptions of fairness, economic expectations, and a myriad of other criteria 
that are difficult to weight or quantify in an objective manner. 
Sanctions for non-compliance are regulated, but interviews suggest that enforcement is 
weak.  The fines imposed on firms that do not abide by minimum wage laws range from one to 
150 times the minimum wage (Table 1).  No fines or punishments are legislated in Costa Rica, 
Jamaica, or Mexico.
16  In some countries, enforcement is legislated, but not carried out due to a 
lack of resources – ranging from a lack of vehicles to do inspections to no telephones to receive 
complaints from workers.  The scarce data on enforcement show that fines are rarely imposed.  
In Chile, for example, 244 fines were issued in 2001, totalling $60,000, as compared to the $2.9 
million collected in fines for all labor violations that year.  This would suggest that minimum 
                                                   
13 If unions and employers define the minimum wage, it is preferred to have multiple minimum wages such that the 
agreed upon union wage is not imposed on the whole country in the form of a single minimum wage.  While it may 
be argued that the employers will check the wage demands of unions, this does not happen to the extent that it 
should since wage bargaining is a repeated game where employers risk union retaliation if demands are not met.  
Thus, the tripartite system may exclude the interests of low wage workers who are inexpensive to fire, relative to 
union workers.  
14 Argentina, Bahamas, Belize, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Peru, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago 
15 www.ilo.org/travaildatabase/servlet/minimumwages 
16 Sources:  www.ilo.org; individual interviews   7
wages would have little impact in Latin America, since the wage is paid at the discretion of the 
employer, with little government oversight, or if there is, little cost of punishment. 
 
International Lessons in Minimum Wage Institutions  
Heterogeneity in minimum wage institutions is not limited to LAC.  Across the world, the 
number of minimum wages, coverage, minimum wage setting mechanisms, and enforcement 
mechanisms differ.  For example, Italy and Germany have hundreds of minimum wages that are 
negotiated and enforced by unions under a strong contract law framework.  Australia’s hundreds 
of minimum wages are part of a larger labor “awards system” which specifies all remuneration 
for job types by states (though this is being simplified).  In the United States, the federal 
minimum wage may be over-ridden by the state minimum wage; state inspectors are responsible 
for enforcement.  In Japan, each prefecture (state) has its own minimum wage, which is 
recommended by local Councils comprised of public interest groups, worker representatives, and 
employer representatives (Starr 1982).   
The US and European experience suggests that complex wage structures are effective if they 
co-exist with institutions that allow for appropriate wage setting and effective enforceability.  
While multiple minimum wages are desirable to tailor the “fair” wages to a particular geographic 
area, skills level, or productivity level, they are only successful if an equally complex system of 
oversight accompanies them.  The Italian and German systems of multiple minimum wages 
allow for such complexity since they are monitored by the unions that negotiated the contracts.  
The U.S. system with state-level minimum wage has state inspectors to handle the monitoring 
and enforcement.  Clearly identified actors who monitor specific minimum wages are largely 
absent in Latin America.   8
The OECD minimum wage experience also suggests that minimum wages are better set and 
enforced if many strategic partners are included in the process but capture is avoided.  
Governments often do not have the resources to inspect all labor complaints.  However, 
employer and worker representatives, local councils, public interest groups, and NGOs can aid 
the government by alerting inspectors to specific violations.  For this to be effective, such groups 
need be part of the wage setting process such that they have ownership and the desire to enforce 
the wages that they helped to set (Starr 1982).  However, full representation is necessary, 
including those who are most at risk of losing from a higher minimum wage.  If only union and 
employers are present, they have the potential to bargain a union wage, and then impose it on the 
whole country, thus setting a wage that is too high for the lower end of the labor market, where 
union workers (and their protected jobs, in Latin America) tend not to be. 
The complexity of the minimum wage institutions does not allow us to make any 
conclusions on the effectiveness or quality of such legislation in the LAC region.  Instead, we 
turn to the data to reveal patterns or lessons emerging from the region. 
 




Nineteen countries were selected for the empirical analysis, based on data availability.  They 
represent a wide variety of countries in the LAC region. They cover different levels of GDP per 
capita - Argentina is the richest with US$ 12,344 per capita (pre-crisis data were utilized) while 
Nicaragua is the lowest with US$ 2,300 per capita
17 - different country sizes (Brazil to Jamaica) 
and all geographical regions within LAC.  The Caribbean analysis is limited to Dominican 
                                                   
17 For 2000. Source: World Bank "World Development Indicators" published in 2002.    9
Republic, Guyana, and Jamaica due to an absence of recent household or labor surveys in most 
Caribbean countries. 
Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS), Labor Force Surveys (LFS) or Household 
Surveys are used (see Table 2 for details).  The Dominican Republic survey is from 1997 while 
the remaining 18 data sets are from 1998 or later (see Table 2). 
  For each country, the sample is restricted to facilitate comparison across countries and to 
make the link to minimum wages as clear as possible. The samples include all 16-70 year olds - 
essentially the work force - and only urban households. The latter restriction is mainly due to 
data limitations, since several of the samples only cover urban households, and the measurement 
of wages and hours worked in rural areas is particularly complex.  We use data only from the 
metropolitan area in those countries where the data only cover the metropolitan areas or where 
the minimum wage differs across geographical confines.
18 
  We only include individuals who report 30-50 hours worked per week. This restriction is 
imposed because the treatment of part time work differs by country.  In countries that mandate a 
daily minimum wage, wages of part-time workers can easily be measured.  However, in 
countries that define a monthly minimum wage, the wages of minimum wage workers is less 
clearly defined. Hence, by restricting the samples to those who work 30-50 hours per week it 
becomes easier to spot whether or not the minimum wage is binding.
19  Workers who do not 
report hours worked are also excluded from the sample. 
                                                   
18 Mexico: Area 1, which includes Mexico City; Chile: Great Santiago; Uruguay: Montevideo. Panama: Region 1, 
i.e. Panamá, Colón and San Miguelito. 
19 This is not to imply that minimum wages cannot be binding for individuals who work above 50 hours or below 30 
hours per week but only that we have a cleaner experiment by imposing this restriction.     10
  “Wage” is defined as the wage income from the primary job of each individual.  The self-
employed are thus not included in the analysis, nor are workers with zero (unpaid workers) or 
with unreported income.  All minimum wages are converted to monthly wages in order to allow 
for general comparisons across the region.   
  The sample is split into formal and informal sector workers to allow for differential impacts 
of the minimum wage in the markets where it should (formal) and should not (informal) be 
binding.  This disaggregation also proved to be important in the Maloney and Nuñez (2004) 
findings.  Since only wage earners are included in the sample, the informal self-employed, who 
comprise approximately 30 percent of LAC labor markets, are not included. 
 
Minimum Wage Variable 
  The minimum wage variable is drawn from various official sources and World Bank 
documents (Table 2).  The minimum wages, in local currency, that are used in this paper, as well 
as their US$ PPP-adjusted equivalents are given in Table 3.  While several countries have 
multiple minimum wages (Table 1), the most common minimum wage is used for this exercise, 
in terms of the share of the work force it covers and/or the (geographic) coverage of the 
household/labor survey being used.  If there is not a particularly common minimum wage or the 
geographic coverage does not dictate which minimum to use, an average minimum wage is used.  
The countries in the table are ranked from the highest to the lowest PPP-adjusted minimum wage 
value.  The PPP-adjusted value of the minimum wage is the most generous in Paraguay, at $546 
monthly, and the least generous in Uruguay equaling only $45 monthly.   
Perhaps a more appropriate benchmark is not the minimum wage in other countries, but 
other wages in the local labor market.  Figures 1 and 2 present the minimum wage using three   11
alternative benchmarks:  mean wages, wages of the unskilled working population, and the 
official poverty line.
20  The minimum wage is below the mean wage in all countries, ranging 
from 18 (Uruguay) to 72 percent of mean wages (Paraguay).  Half of the sample countries have 
ratios below 40 percent of the respective mean wages.  Venezuela, Guyana, Ecuador and 
Paraguay all have a ratio above 60 percent. Most European countries have a ratio in the interval 
of 50 to 60 percent while the US and UK have ratios close to 40 percent. 
Maloney and Nuñez (2004) point out that the mean wage is not a good benchmark for the 
minimum wage, due to outliers in the right tail.  They use the median wage as a benchmark and 
find for their eight country sample, the ratio ranges from 27 percent (Uruguay) to 69 percent 
(Colombia), which compares to the 18 percent and 52 percent ratios, respectively, of the 
minimum to mean wage ratio (Figure 1). 
Based on this ratio one cannot argue that the minimum wage in, say, Uruguay is too low and 
that it is too high in Paraguay. Comparison between countries is not valid without conditioning 
on the skill distribution. If a country has a large dispersion in its level of skills then it would have 
a wide wage dispersion and a lower ratio of minimum wage to mean wage, and vice versa.  
Perhaps a more appropriate measure is to compare the minimum wage to the wages of low-
skilled workers, whose productivity levels are most similar to those workers who would be 
minimum wage earners.  Presumably, this is one group of workers who should benefit from the 
minimum wage, and although the educational systems can differ widely between countries it 
should nevertheless make the ratios more comparable. 
  Figure 1 shows that even when “controlling” for skill level by a ratio of minimum wage 
to mean wage of low-skilled workers, the heterogeneity among the 19 countries prevails, and is 
even amplified.  The ratio of the minimum wage to the mean wage of unskilled workers, defined 
                                                   
20 The source of the poverty line used for each country is given in Table 2.   12
as those with a primary school education or less, ranges from 0.21 (Uruguay) to 1.43 (Paraguay), 
indicating that the minimum wage is 43 percent higher than the average wage of unskilled 
workers in Paraguay and 89 percent below the unskilled worker wage in Uruguay.  Ten of the 19 
sample countries have minimum wages that are more than 70 percent of the average unskilled 
wage.  A similar exercise by Maloney and Nuñez (2004) uses the 10
th percentile wage as the 
base; they show an even higher correlation between the minimum wage and low wage workers. 
Finally, we examine the level of the minimum wage relative to the official poverty line.
21, 22  
The minimum wage is above the poverty line for a household with a single person for all 
countries except Jamaica, Uruguay, El Salvador, and Mexico (Figure 1) and is up to 6.5 times the 
poverty line in Guyana.
23  However, if the minimum wage must stretch to cover the needs of the 
household, as is mandated in much minimum wage legislation in the Region, it falls short.  If a 
minimum wage worker is supporting both him/herself and a single household dependent (a non-
working household member), it is only sufficient to cover the basic needs in seven of the 17 
sample countries (Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Chile, Honduras, Guyana, Nicaragua, and 
Peru).  Since poor households tend to have more dependents,
24 the minimum wage will not be 
sufficient to meet the basic needs of the household, let alone providing for education, leisure, and 
                                                   
21 The official poverty line is commonly calculated as the value of a basic goods consumption basket, which 
contains the foodstuffs necessary to meet the minimum daily caloric intake of a person (adjusted for sex and age) 
and the clothing, shelter, and other basic necessities for a minimum standard of living.  The value of this basket may 
be used as a poverty line, while the value of only the food portion of the basket may be used to identify the indigent 
poor. 
22 The CPI was used to adjust the poverty line to correspond to the year for the individual (household) data. While 
the CPI is an imperfect adjustment factor since it does not necessarily reflect the evolution in the prices of the basic 
foods basket items, the price adjustments are only necessary for a few years so the potential bias is not likely to be 
large. We did not have access to regional deflators and/or regional poverty lines, which could lead to substantial 
bias.  For example, the difference between poverty lines in Lima compared to coastal urban areas in Peru is 25 
percent (World Bank, 1999).  
23 Ecuador, Venezuela, and Panama are not included in the exercise since the poverty lines corresponding to the 
most recent data set were not available, and an appropriate CPI series could not be obtained. 
24 For instance, Mexican households with a per capita income between 0.5 and 0.9 of the poverty line have an 
average household size of 4.1 persons per household while the average size of households with a per capita income 
between 1.5 and 2 times the poverty line is 3.2 (ENEU 1999, author’s calculations).   13








  Approximately 0.4 percent to 18 percent of the population in the countries in the sample 
earns the minimum wage. Figure 3 presents the share of the working population earning 0-95% 
of the minimum wage, the share earning in the range of +/- 5% of the minimum wages and are 
categorized as “minimum wages” earners,
26 and the share earning more than 5 percent above the 
minimum wage.   In Brazil, Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela, more than 10 percent of the labor 
force are minimum wage earners, while less than five percent of the labor force are minimum 
wage earners in 12 of the 15 remaining countries.  Notably, three of the four countries with the 
highest minimum wage to mean wage ratio (Figure 1) also have the largest share of their 
population earning the minimum wage; Brazil is the outlier, with a large share earning the 
minimum but a low minimum to mean wage ratio.   
  Among the sampled countries 0.7 percent to 45 percent of the workforce are sub-minimum 
wage earners. Most noticeable is the wide variation across countries. At one extreme, five 
countries have about 40 percent of their workers earning below 95 percent of the minimum wage 
(Paraguay, Ecuador, Guyana, Nicaragua and Colombia). At the other extreme, less than 3 percent 
earn below 95 percent of the minimum wage in Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay.  The country 
                                                   
25 The discussion does not conclude that minimum wage earners do not cover their basic needs baskets since poor 
households, in particular, obtain income from other sources, such as social protection mechanisms, remittances, odd-
jobs, and in-kind payments.  Instead, the discussion is intended to give the reader a sense of the level of the 
minimum wage, using as a benchmark other commonly used statistics. 
26 A range rather than a single value is used to identify minimum wage earners to allow for a certain discrepancy 
between the stipulated minimum wage and the reported earnings, which, for instance, could arise due to conversion 
of hourly minimum wages to monthly levels.     14
ranking of the share of the population earning below the minimum wage is similar to the country 
ranking of the minimum wage to mean wage ratio, i.e. countries with higher minimum wages are 





Figure 3 does not reveal very much about how important the minimum wage is to the wage 
distribution.  For example, in Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay, where few workers earn at or 
below the minimum wage, there might be important effects of the minimum wage for a sub-set 
of the labor force, or the minimum wage might affect other parts of the wage distribution.  A 
budding minimum wage literature also recognizes the importance of considering the whole wage 
distribution rather than limiting the analysis to average wage effects at the minimum, as is 
common in most literature (Neumark, Schweitzer and Wascher, 2000 for the US; Maloney and 
Nuñez, 2004 for Colombia; Arango and Pinchon, 2004 for Colombia; Siga and Cunningham, 
2005 for Mexico).   
We use the methodology presented by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) and Maloney and 
Nuñez (2004) to examine the wage distributions of formal and informal sector wages in the 19 
country sample, and how the minimum wage may be responsible for the shape of the distribution.  
Kernel density plots are estimated for each country-sector combination.  They are basically a 
continuous version of discrete histograms, i.e. they smooth a line between each observation xi along 
the x-axis or group of observations within a certain part (bandwidth) of the x-axis in order to obtain 
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where K is the Kernel density function, h is the bandwidth, n the number of observations, and x 
is some point along the x-axis. The basic idea is to estimate the density f(x) from the fraction of 
the sample that is near to x, i.e. the fraction that falls into the bandwidth, h.
27,28 
  We present both kernel density plots and the cumulative density plots, the latter not 
requiring any assumptions about bandwidths, thus giving an alternative illustration of the wage 
distribution.  If the kernel density plots show an extremely high concentration at a particular 
wage, i.e. we see a “spike,” and at the same wage, the cumulative distribution becomes vertical 
i.e. we see a "cliff," then we know that wage are not randomly distributed, but that something is 
affecting the wage distribution and causing a clustering at that wage.  If that wage coincides with 
the minimum wage, which, as discussed in the institutional description above, is a random wage, 
then there is a good chance that the minimum wage legislation is the factor behind the spike in 
the kernel density plot.  Alternative influences are also examined later in this paper.   
  The plots can also test if the minimum wage is binding, give insights into whether it is 
enforced, and comment on coverage.  The minimum wage is binding if wages in, what would 
otherwise be a continuous distribution, are pulled up to the level of the minimum.  If the 
minimum is set below the market clearing wage, it may still be binding if the minimum wage is 
used to set wages higher in the minimum wage.  It is enforced if it is binding and all individuals 
covered by the minimum wage legislation (formal sector workers) receive a salary equal to or 
higher than the minimum wage.  If the minimum wage falls below the market clearing level, we 
cannot say anything about whether or not the minimum wage is enforced.  Finally, all formal 
                                                   
27 See Deaton (1997) for a more detailed explanation. 
28 The Epanechnikov kernel is used, as it is the most efficient in minimizing the mean integrated squared error.  We 
allow the bandwidth to differ by the density plot, which allows us to use the smallest bandwidth possible for each 
country sample.  Generally, a bandwidth was chosen to allow for some discontinuities in the kernel density plot, but 
the location of the spikes were endogenously determined. The smaller the bandwidth, the lower is the risk of bias in 
the density estimate compared to the true density since less extrapolation  is required.   16
sector workers should be covered by the minimum, since it is a part of the labor benefit that they 
should receive, by definition, but the informal sector should not be covered, meaning that their 
kernel density plots should not be affected by the minimum.  If they are, then perhaps the 
minimum wage does bind informal sector wages.   
IV.   Who Are the Minimum Wage Earners?  
 
In the U.S. and Europe, the minimum wage has insignificant effects on the wage distribution 
since so few workers are minimum wage earners.  Thus, before examining the wage distributions 
in LAC, it is useful to understand who are the minimum wage earners, which will give us an 
indication of whether or not we should expect to see minimum wage effects in the general 
population or if it is necessary to limit the analysis to certain groups, as is commonly done in 
OECD countries.   
Unlike in the US and Europe, minimum wage earners in LAC are spread across the 
population (Table 4).   For example, while 10-20 percent of workers who define their 
relationship to the household head as a “child” also claim to earn at or below the minimum wage, 
3-10 percent of household heads and 8-20 percent of spouses, also claim this.  While 26-70 
percent of working 12-17 years olds claim to earn at or below the minimum, Up to 12 percent of 
prime-aged adults are minimum wage earners or less.  And contrary to the US, the proportion of 
each income quintile that are minimum wage earners decreases by wealth quintile.  Thus, it 
appears that a substantial size of the general work force is at or below the minimum wage, unlike 
the primarily youth-based minimum wage labor force in OECD countries. 
Even if minimum wage workers are distributed across the population, there are still certain 
groups that are over-represented in the minimum wage labor force.  Tables 5 and 6 present the   17
share of sub-minimum and minimum wage earners by age, education level, sector of 
employment, and gender for the 19 country sample.  A ratio above 1 indicates that the group is 
over-represented, relative to their share of the labor force as a whole. The higher the ratio, the 
more over-represented is the group among the sub-minimum or minimum wage labor force. 
Similarly to the OECD countries, young workers are over-represented among minimum and sub-
minimum wage earners.  The first column of Table 5 shows that in all but four countries in the 
sample, those who are age 16-19 are a larger share of the minimum wage population than of the labor 
force population.  Of the countries in the sample, the young are the most over-represented among 
minimum wage earners in Uruguay (ratio = 2.6), while they are the least over-represented in 
Paraguay (ratio=0.3) and Ecuador (ratio=0.4).   Young workers are even more over-represented 
among the sub-minimum population (first column of Table 6).  Across the region, older workers (age 
55-64 years old) are not uniformly over- or under-represented among minimum wage earners.       
The less skilled are over-represented in the minimum wage labor force in most of the region.  
With the exception of Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela, those without 
any formal education are a larger share of the minimum wage population than of the general working 
population.  This trend is even stronger for the sub-minimum population, where the unskilled are 
over-represented in all countries.  The trends for primary education are similar (Tables 5 and 6). 
Employees in the informal sector are over-represented among minimum and sub-minimum wage 
workers.  In all countries except Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, and Paraguay, the ratio in Table 5 is 
greater than 1, with particularly high ratios in Mexico (3.7), Guatemala (2.0), Chile (1.9), and Brazil 
(1.8).  These trends are reflected in the sub-minimum population.  Although it may be argued that the 
correlation is spurious since informal sector employees tend to be low skilled and thus their marginal 
productivity may happen to coincide with the minimum wage, later sections of this paper show that 
this is not necessarily the case.     18
Women and the self-employed are neither more nor less likely to be minimum wage workers.  
Table 5 shows that throughout the region, women’s share of the minimum wage population is similar 
to their share of the working population (near the value of 1).   The exceptions are Argentina, Brazil, 
Honduras, Mexico, and Uruguay, where the ratio is a value of 1.3 or higher.  Similarly, women are 
not necessarily over-represented among the sub-minimum population, though certain outliers 
emerge, namely Bolivia, Honduras, Mexico, and Uruguay.  However, the countries where women are 
over-represented among minimum wage workers are not necessarily those where they are over-
represented among sub-minimum wage workers.  A note of caution is necessary, though, since the 
table only considers full time workers; expanding the sample to include part time employees, among 
which women are over-represented, may lead to a different conclusion.   
The self-employed are largely under-represented among minimum wage earners.  In the small 
sample where the self-employed could be identified, they were over-represented among the minimum 
wage earners only in Bolivia, Jamaica, and Mexico, with ratios between 0.l4 and 0.9 for the other 
eight countries in the sample.  Conversely, the self-employed are over-represented among the sub-
minimum population in all countries in the sample.  This may suggest a greater relative number of 
workers with very low income in the self-employed sector, with a thinning of the population near the 
minimum wage.  Or, it may suggest a smooth distribution for the self-employed whose incomes we 
would not expect to be affected by the minimum wage, but a “sweeping up” of low-wage workers 
whose wages are near the mandated minimum.   
Overall, the wages of workers whose marginal productivity is near the minimum wage may 
converge to the minimum wage.  Uruguay, Jamaica, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Bolivia have the 
lowest ratio of minimum wage workers and also have more women, low educated, and young at the 
minimum than expected.  Thus, even though the minimum wage population is small in these 
countries, it disproportionately affects certain sectors of the population, which are the groups that are 
often the hardest to employ, whether due to time constraints (school, family care) that limit job   19
choice, training, and job duration for youth and women or due to low human capital of youth (little 
experience)  Conversely, in countries where a high share of the population are minimum or sub-
minimum wage earners – namely Paraguay and Ecuador – women, unskilled, and the young are 
under-represented among minimum wage earners.  Thus, given the distribution of productivity and 
corresponding wages, the minimum wage may have the effect of sweeping up those whose 
productivity (and market wage) are near the minimum, but it may not affect the wages of those 
whose market wage is far from the mandated minimum. 
 
V.    Minimum Wage Effects on the Wage Distribution  
 
Impacts on the Formal Sector Wage Distribution 
  Minimum wages affect the formal sector wage distribution in ten of the 19 countries 
sampled: Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and 
Venezuela. Spikes in the wage distribution for these countries occur at the minimum wage, as 
shown in the first graph in each row of Figure 4.  The “cliffs” in the second graph in each row of 
Figure 4 confirm the conclusion.  The minimum wage seems particularly important in Brazil, 
where the affect on the wage distribution is indisputable.  The results for Ecuador and Guyana 
are less clear, since they may simply show that the minimum is equal to the average wage for the 
labor market, resulting in a normal distribution centered on the minimum wage.
29  There is 
weaker evidence that the minimum wage affects formal sector wages in Bolivia, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Jamaica since the kernel density plots show spikes, but the 
cumulative density plots do not.  The conclusion that there are few cases in which the minimum 
                                                   
29 Figure 3 shows that half the Guyanese and Ecuadorian labor forces earn at or below the minimum wage.   20
wage definitively affects the formal sector wage distribution in LAC is very much in line with 
Maloney and Nuñez (2004), though for a smaller set of countries. 
Variance in institutional factors do not explain the observation that the minimum wage is 
binding in the formal sector in some countries but not in others.  The countries where the 
minimum wage affects the formal sector wage distribution do not share any single institutional 
characteristics:  some have a single minimum wage (Brazil) while others have dozens of 
minimum wage levels (Paraguay, Venezuela), the minimum wages is above the market clearing 
wage for low-skilled workers in some countries (Paraguay, Ecuador) and below it in others 
(Brazil, Chile), or its level is centrally established in some (Chile, Brazil) and set by tripartite 
committee in others (Colombia).  In none of these countries is enforcement particularly strong 
and union power varies (Cunningham and Santamaria, 2003).   
  The kernel density and cumulative plots in Figure 4 show "spikes" and "cliffs" at wages 
other than the minimum wage, as well.  In some cases, the abrupt changes elsewhere in the 
distribution are more pronounced than at the minimum wage. This could be due to a “numeraire 
effect,” in which the spikes arise at multiples of the minimum wage
30 or it may simply be 
because people tend to report round numbers so the spikes may be a result of measurement error. 
  In some countries, spikes occur at multiples of the minimum wage, which are not round 
numbers.  Taking as examples Jamaica and Mexico, two countries where the formal sector wage 
distribution does not show notable disruptions at the minimum, we observe numeraire effects.  
Notably, the minimum wage is set very low in both countries, and the value of the minimum 
wage is not a “round number,” being $3440 Jamaican dollars weekly and 888 Mexican pesos 
daily.  Figure 5 shows that the minimum wage has pronounced effects throughout the wage 
                                                   
30 This phenomenon has been particularly well documented in Brazil, where spikes at multiples of the minimum 
wage clearly emerge in several studies using different methodologies (Neri, Gonzaga, and Camargo 2000; Soares 
1998; Lemos 2002; Maloney and Nuñez for Colombia 2004).   21
distributions with clear spikes at multiples of the minimum wage – 1, 1.5, 2, 3, and 4 5 times the 
minimum in Jamaica and 1, 1.25, 2, 2.5, and 3 times the minimum in Mexico – despite the fact 
that the density of the wage distribution at the minimum wage is low.   
  Other countries show spikes in the kernel density function at “round numbers.”  This is the 
case for El Salvador and possibly Venezuela (Figure 6), where the spikes and cliffs occur at the 
minimum wage and at round numbers that are not necessarily multiples of the minimum wage.  
This may be due to employers choosing to pay round wages or due to reporting bias by workers.  
When the minimum wage is a round number, as in the case for Chile and Venezuela (100,000 in 
each), it is impossible to disentangle the minimum wage effects from the rounding effects using 
kernel density plots.  Thus, we can be less conclusive about the minimum wage versus rounding 
effects in these countries. 
  A final observation is that the minimum wage is not enforced in the formal sector in any 
country in the sample.  Every wage distribution shows full-time workers earning below the 
minimum wage, even in countries with very low minimum wage levels (Mexico, Uruguay).   
   22
Impacts on Informal Sector Wage Distributions 
 
  Despite the fact that minimum wages are not legally binding in the informal sector, by 
definition, the kernel density plots and cumulative density plots find that the minimum wage 
seems to influence the informal sector wage distribution.  In 14 of the 19 countries in the sample, 
a spike was found in the kernel density plot and a cliff was evident in the cumulative density 
plots at the minimum wage.  In addition to those countries for which the minimum affected 
formal sector wage distributions, effects were found in Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Mexico.  In the Dominican Republic and Uruguay, a spike was evident, but no cliff was visible 
in the cumulative density plot.  Given the large number of countries for which this phenomenon 
is observed, it is not surprising that there are no common factors in the minimum wage 
institutions of the affected labor markets.   
In most cases, the "spike" at the vertical minimum wage line is more pronounced for the 
informal sector than the formal sector wage distributions.  This may indicate that the minimum is 
more binding in the (unskilled) informal sector than in the formal sector, or other factors may be at 
play.  From the labor supply side, the minimum may be a benchmark for “fair” wages.  Foguel 
(1997) argues that workers value not only their absolute wage, but also the wage relative to others of 
similar skill level.  While the exact value of a comparator wage in the formal sector may not be easily 
measured, the value in terms of minimum wages may be estimated.  On the demand side, employers 
may pay the number of minimum wages comparable to the formal sector market wage for a 
particular occupation so that their employees will not leave for a similar job in the formal sector, a 
kind of efficiency wage.  Or, they may not be willing to provide all legislated labor benefits, but they 
may be willing to pay the minimum wage.  Finally, the results may be a statistical artifact:  since 
informal sector wages are lower than formal sector wages, the presence of more individuals in the 
lower part of the distribution – where the minimum wage tends to be – may lead to more of a “piling   23
up” around the minimum wage in the informal sector than in the formal sector.  Thus, minimum 
wages may be equally binding in both sectors, but the lower-wages of informal sector workers may 
give an appearance of being more binding.  The empirical evidence from Brazil (Fajnzylber 2002; 
Neri, Gonzaga and Camargo 2000; Soares 1998) and Mexico (Cunningham and Siga, 2006), which 
uses panel data to identify the impact of the changes in the minimum wage on the wage distribution, 
shows that this last explanation is not the case. 
 
Controlling for Skill Level - Low Skilled 
  While minimum wage effects are observed across the wage distribution, it is worth 
“controlling” for the skill level of the population and examining the minimum wage effects for 
that segment of the population for whom we expect minimum wages to be the most important:  
the low-skilled.  In previous sections, the level of the minimum wage was close to the wages of 
certain "vulnerable" groups: low-skilled, non-prime age earners, females and non-formal sector 
workers in countries with a relatively low level of minimum wages compared to the general 
wage level, but possibly too high to affect vulnerable groups in countries where the minimum 
wage is relatively high compared to the general wage distribution.    
Looking at kernel density plots for the various skill levels for countries with low (Mexico), 
medium (Brazil), and high (Paraguay, Ecuador) relative minimum wages, we find the same 
tendency: the minimum wage seems to affect the wage distribution for low-skilled in countries 
with a low ratio of minimum wages to mean wage, namely  Brazil and Mexico (Figure 7). The 
"cliff" in the cumulative distribution is higher for individuals with no school than it is for 
primary, which in turn has a more pronounced "cliff" than secondary education. Hence, it seems 
as if the minimum wage serves to raise the wage above the market clearing level for low skilled 
more than higher skilled. The equilibrium wage, i.e. the wage determined by market forces, is   24
simply too high for high skilled, which probably is the main reason why it appears not to be 
binding for this group of workers. 
  However, in countries where the minimum wage/mean wage ratio is relatively high (e.g. 
Paraguay and Ecuador) the minimum wage affects the wage distribution of low skilled less than 
the wage distribution of higher skilled (Figure 8). Individuals with high education are still not 
affected much but the wage distribution of workers with secondary education seems to be more 
affected by the minimum wage than workers with primary school and in particular more than 
workers with no school. 
  Hence, the minimum wages does not generally affect the wage distribution of low-skilled 
more than it affects the wage distribution of high-skilled. Instead, the results differs depending 
on the level of the minimum wage relative to the market wages in that country.  This has 
important implications for understanding the role of the minimum wage as a poverty alleviation 
tool. It indicates that to some extent companies have so much "bargaining power" that they can 
comply with minimum wages for the group of workers they find should receive this wage and 
discard the minimum wage if it is too high compared to the skills.  
 
VI.   Conclusions 
There is no single minimum wage institution in Latin America and the Caribbean.  The wage 
setting institutions, criteria, coverage, exemptions, periodicity, and enforcement differ greatly 
across the region.  The level of the minimum wage ranges from less than 20 percent of low-
skilled wages to 43 percent higher than the low-skilled wage, and from less than the poverty line 
to more than six times the poverty line.  Up to 20 percent of the labor force earns the minimum 
in some countries and as few as 1 percent in other countries.   25
Despite this heterogeneity, there are some regional trends.  First, although minimum wages 
are more evenly distributed across the labor force in LAC than in the OECD countries, minimum 
wage earners are concentrated among the young, informal sector employees, and low-educated 
workers.  While women are slightly over-represented among minimum wage earners, they do not 
stand out as much as the other groups.   
Second, the minimum wage is more wide-reaching than theory would predict.  It affects 
wages not only in the formal sector, but also in the uncovered informal sector.  Kernel density 
plots show clear “spikes” at the minimum wage, even in countries where the minimum is not a 
round number.  Ten countries demonstrate effects in both sectors, and another four show effects 
only in the informal sectors.  Several countries show spikes at multiples of the minimum wage, 
suggesting that the minimum is not only useful for affecting wages near the minimum, but also 
for impacting wages throughout the distribution. 
When controlling for skill level, we find that wages “lock in” to the minimum if it is near 
their wage.  Thus, in countries with a low minimum, relative to the mean wage, spikes are seen 
in the density plots of the least skilled workers, while the spikes are visible among the most 
skilled workers in countries with high minimum wages. 
Finally, the minimum is not enforced in any country in the region.  All sample countries show 
workers in both the formal and informal sectors that earn below the minimum.  Perhaps this is not 
surprising, since enforcement mechanisms are weak, but for some reason employers, and particularly 
those in the informal sector who are not legally bound by the minimum, choose to adjust wages when 
the legally mandated wage is changed.  This may be due to the use of the minimum as a benchmark 
for “fair wages” in the economy, regardless of their purchasing power or the criteria for setting them.   26
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21  M, D, T  N, R, S, O  G  Annual  N, D, C, I, O 
Domestic or 
rural workers no 
1 to 150 mw 
per worker   
Venezuela 
Hundreds 
(by sector)  M  R, S, I, O  T, G  annual  P, G, L 
Apprentices, 
youth  yes N/A  a 
Source:  interviews with Labor Ministries; Gonzaga and Scandiuzzi (1998); Ruiz (2001); Starr (1993); www1.umn.edu/humanrts/esc/bolivia2001.html; 
www.salaryexpert.com/seco/careerjournal/hrcodes/COUNTRIES.htm; www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/govlab/legrel/papers/brfnotes/minwages; 
www.mintrab.cl; www.mtps.gob.pe; www.stps.gov.mx; www.set.gov.do/legislacion/salariomin/index.htm; www.ilo.org/travaildatabase/servlet/minimumwages; 
www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/oiea/wagestudy . 
a)   Automatic adjustment if the inflation rate rises by 10% or more 
b)    Fines are rarely imposed, only large firms are generally inspected 
c)    Incomplete information since the Department of labor inspection is located outside ministry and without phones 
d)    Enforcement generally at regional level - no information presently available  32
e)    The Ministry does not impose fines; it only warn and takes to court.  
f)  Codigo del trabajo Art 44 & Art 477: firms with 1 to 49 workers: $40 to $800 monthly per worker affected. Firms with 50 to 199 workers: $80 to $1600 
monthly per worker affected. firms with over 200  workers: $120 to $2400 monthly per worker affected.   
g)  The fines are a function of the number of workers and the number of infractions.  Fines range from the equivalent of US$200 for first infraction with 1-5 workers to  
US$1800 for multiple infractions involving hundreds of workers. 
h)  Legally, 1500 minimum wages are on the books, as a result of the bargaining under the military dictatorship.  In practice, though, only one minimum wage applies. 
i)  According to Article 121 of the Supreme Decree 21615, (29 May, 1987), the Labor Judges may impose a fine of $1,000 –10,000 bolivianos, for infractions 
1.  N/A indicates that the data are not available  33
Table 2. Data sources 
Country Household/individual data Minimum wage Poverty line
Argentina
Household Survey: Encuesta 
Permanente de Hogares
INDEC (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y 
Censos
Government's official poverty line 
by INDEC (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica y Censos)
Bolivia Household Survey
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica de 
Bolivia. http://www.ine.gov.bo/
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica de 
Bolivia. http://www.ine.gov.bo/
Brazil Household Survey IPEA, www.ipea.gov.br
Ferreira, Lanjouw and Neri (2000) 
"A new poverty profile for Brazil 
using PPV, PNAD and census 
data", PUC-Rio, Department of 
Economics, TD # 418
Chile
Household Survey: Gran Santiago’s 
Employment And Unemployment 
Survey (Encuesta de Ocupacion y 
Desocupacion de Gran Santiago). 
National Institute of Statistics (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadisticas (INE)). 
Monthly Memory, Central Bank of Chile.
http://www.bcentral.cl/esp/
Source: “Social Equity / Poverty 
Reduction and Poverty Targeted 
Investment (PTI)”, June 2001, Inter-
American Development Bank
Colombia
Household Survey: National 
Household Survey (Encuesta 
Nacional de Hogares), carried out by 
the National Department of Statistics 
(DANE) and the National Department 
of Planning (DNP)
 "Estadísticas Monetarias y Financieras". 
Banco de la República; Función Pública.
DANE (the Colombian statistical 
Agency) Source: Colombia poverty 
report, World Bank.
Costa Rica Household Survey
Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y 
Política Económica (MIDEPLAN),  
http://www.mideplan.go.cr/sides/economic
o/03-11.htm
Poverty Assessment report, 1997, 
Annex 3, p. 40.
Dom. Rep. LFS
http://www.oit.or.cr/oit/papers/mer_trab_re
p_dom.pdf Poverty assessment, 2001
Ecuador LFS Central Bank of Ecuador Only 2 $/day available
El Salvador LSMS http://www.pridex.com.sv/mdobra2.htm
DIGESTYC. Encuestas de Hogares 
de Propósitos Múltiples.
Guatemala LSMS
Guatemala: Livelihoods, Labor Markets, 
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Table 3. Minimum wages in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Country  Year  monthly mw 
mw in PPP- 
adjusted US$ 
Paraguay 2000  680168  $546 
El Salvador  1998  1083.6  $446 
DR 1997  2412  $429 
Costa Rica  1999  54938 $423 
Chile 2001  100000  $335 
Colombia 1999  236438  $293 
Guatemala 2000  712  $289 
Honduras 1999  1419  $221 
Brazil 1999 136  $205 
Argentina 2000  200  $200 
Panama 1998  206  $185 
Guyana 1999 19000  $181 
Peru 1999  345  $124 
Bolivia 1999  330  $90 
Jamaica 1998  800  $75 
Ecuador 1998 762967  $75 
Venezuela 1998  100000  $54 
Mexico 1999 888.81  $50 
Uruguay 1998  990  $45 
Nicaragua 2001  1000  NA 
Note: The minimum wage line for Dominican Republic is for large companies. Small and medium size companies have 
minimum wages that are 72 and 64 percent respectively of the large company level. The definition of a Large company is: 
Companies with installations or goods, or the sum of them, for value above of RD$500.000.00. Medium company: 
installations or goods, or the sum of them, for value between RD$200.000.000 and RD$500.000.00. Small company: 
installations or goods, or the sum of them, for value below RD$200.000.00;  PPP conversion factors are obtained from the 
"GDF and WDI central (August 2002)" World Bank database 
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Table 4:  Percent in each category who earn at or below the minimum wage 
 Argentina  Brazil  México
Role in household 
  Head 
  Spouse 
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  25-64 
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  Primary 
  Secondary 

















  Male 











  Self-employment 
  Informal wage 










































Source:  Argentina and Mexico:  Cunningham, Wendy (2002); Brazil:  Neumark, Cunningham, Siga (forthcoming)  
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Table 5:  Ratio of each sub-group’s share of the minimum wage population, relative to their share of 
the total workforce (full time workers only)* 
















Argentina na  na  na  2.0  na  na  1.3 
Bolivia 1.6  3.0  2.1  1.9  1.0  1.5  1.0 
Brazil 2.1  0.9  1.4  1.2  1.8  0.5  1.4 
Chile 1.7  0.7  1.7  1.5  1.9  na  1.1 
Colombia 1.0  0.7  1.2  1.2  1.4  0.7  1.0 
Costa Rica  1.5  1.2  0.6  1.5  Na  na  1.0 
Ecuador 0.4  0.8  0.7  1.1  0.9  0.9  0.9 
El Salvador  1.4  0.3  1.4  1.6  1.0  na  1.1 
Guatemala 1.5  1.2  1.1  0.9  2.0  0.7  1.0 
Guyana 1.1  1.1  1.7  0.8  na  0.4  1.1 
Honduras 0.3  na  1.4  na  0.4  na  1.3 
Jamaica 1.8  1.9  6.5  1.6  1.5  3.0  1.2 
Mexico 1.9  1.6  3.4  1.3  3.7  1.7  1.3 
Nicaragua 1.1  1.1  1.2  0.9  na  na  1.1 
Panama 1.3  0.7  0.9  1.3  0.9  0.9  1.0 
Paraguay 0.3  0.8  0.3  0.9  0.9  na  0.8 
Peru 1.2  0.4  0.2  1.0  1.2  0.4  0.8 
Uruguay 2.6  1.0  1.7  1.4  na  na  1.3 
Venezuela 1.2  0.8  0.8  1.1  1.2  0.7  1.1 
* omitted categories are, respectively, age 20-54, male, formal employee, and secondary school or above.  “na” indicates 
that data were not available to generate the statistic.  Each row is calculated as [(number in group x that earns the minimum 
wage)/(number in group x+y that earns the minimum wage)]/[(number in group x)/(number in group x=y)]; where x is a 
group listed in the first row of the table and y is the complement of x in the labor force.  A value greater than 1 indicates that 
the reference group is over-represented among the minimum wage population. 
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Table 6:  Ratio of each sub-group’s share of the sub-minimum wage population, relative to their 
share of the total workforce (full time workers only)* 
















Argentina  na na  8.1 1.7 na  na 1.0 
Bolivia  1.9  1.6  2.6 1.3 0.8 1.9 1.8 
Brazil  2.2  1.6  3.3 1.2 2.3 1.8 1.0 
Chile  2.9  0.7  1.8 1.5 2.4  na  1.1 
Colombia  1.8  0.9  1.6 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.0 
Costa  Rica  2.3  1.3  3.1 1.8 0.2 n/a 1.3 
Ecuador  1.9  1.0  1.8 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.1 
El  Salvador  2.5  1.8  3.0 1.4 1.0 n/a 1.0 
Guatemala  1.7  2.8  2.1 1.2 1.2 2.0 1.1 
Guyana 1.8  0.8  1.4  1.1  na  1.0  1.3 
Honduras 1.9  1.3  1.1  na  1.5  na  1.5 
Jamaica 1.5  1.3  na  1.4  1.0  3.8  1.1 
Mexico  2.0  2.0  4.7 1.4 3.4 2.4 1.8 
Nicaragua 1.6  0.9  1.4  1.3  n/a  na  1.1 
Panama  2.8  1.1  2.4 1.7 1.7 1.3 0.7 
Paraguay  1.9  0.8  1.9 1.6 1.5  na  1.1 
Peru  2.4  0.9  2.6 1.4 2.0 1.1 1.2 
Uruguay 5.0  0.8  3.4  1.5  n/a  na  1.5 
Venezuela  1.9  1.2  2.1 1.2 1.7 1.4 1.2 
* omitted categories are, respectively, age 20-54, male, formal employee, and secondary school and above.  “na” indicates 
that the data are not available to calculate the statistic.  Each row is calculated as [(number in group x that earns the 
minimum wage)/(number in group x+y that earns the minimum wage)]/[(number in group x)/(number in group x=y)]; where 
x is a group listed in the first row of the table and y is the complement of x in the labor force.  A value greater than 1 
indicates that the reference group is over-represented among the minimum wage population. 
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Figure 1. Minimum wage/mean wage and Minimum wage/mean wages of low skilled  
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Figure 3: Distribution of earnings compared to the minimum wage 




















wage < 0.95*mw wage +/- 5% from mw wage > 1.05*mw
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Figure 4. Kernel densities and cumulative distributions 
(vertical line = minimum wage; on each set of axes: left graph for the informal sector and right 
graph for the formal sector) 
Kernel density plots  Cumulative density function 
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Chile, 2001, Monthly
ln(monthly wage)
 Formal sector  Informal sector
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Notes: Dominican Republic: The minimum wage line is for large companies. Small and medium size companies have 
minimum wages that are 72 and 64 percent respectively of the large company level. The definition of a Large company is: 
Companies with installations or goods, or the sum of them, for value above of RD$500.000.00. Medium company: 
installations or goods, or the sum of them, for value between RD$200.000.000 and RD$500.000.00. Small company: 
installations or goods, or the sum of them, for value below RD$200.000.00.  Ecuador: Average minimum wage.  
Nicaragua: The minimum wage differs across industries. The three lines indicate the three largest industries.  Panama: 
Only companies with 11 or more employees are included in the analysis. Only industries with the same minimum wage are 
included; this means that agriculture, construction and "other" are excluded from the density plots.  
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Figure 5. Numeraire effects, selected countries 
On each set of axes: left graph for the informal sector and right graph for the formal sector 
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Note: The vertical lines for Jamaica are set at 1, 1.5, 2, 3 and 4 times the minimum wage. The vertical lines for Mexico are 
set at 1, 1.25, 1.5, 2, 2.5 and 3 times the minimum wage.    47
 
Figure 6. Round number effects, selected countries 
On each set of axes: left graph for the informal sector and right graph for the formal sector 
Kernel density plots  Cumulative density functions 
El Salvador 
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Note: The vertical lines for El Salvador are set at the minimum wage (left) and at 3000. The vertical lines for Venezuela are 
set at the minimum wage (100,000) and 60000, 200,000 and 300,000. 
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Figure 7. Formal Sector Kernel densities and cumulative distribution for educational groups for 
selected countries with a relatively low mw/mean ratio (vertical line = minimum wage) 
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Figure 8. Kernel densities and cumulative distribution for educational groups for selected 
countries with a relatively high mw/mean ratio (vertical line = minimum wage) 
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